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Abstract
The building of the Panama Canal by the US in 1914 
proved definitively the ascent of the US to regional he-
gemony. Shortly after, World War I would lead the US 
to global primacy. The canal was much more than the 
construction of a shipping route between the Atlantic 
and Pacific oceans; it meant that America was a power 
capable of and willing to reshaping the Western Hemi-
sphere in its way to becoming a world power.
A century later –in 2014- China announced it would 
begin a similar enterprise in Nicaragua. What are the 
geopolitical implications for Latin America? Is this sig-
naling a more assertive Chinese foreign policy seeking –
by ambition or by necessity– to challenge the US in the 
Western Hemisphere? Is this geographic reshaping also 
politically reflecting the emergence of a world power?
Keywords: Latin America, China, United States, geo-
politics, Panama.
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LA RUTA DE LA SEDA LATINOAMERICANA:
CHINA Y EL CANAL DE NICARAGUA
Resumen
La construcción del Canal de Panamá por los Estados Unidos en 1914 demostró de-
finitivamente el ascenso de los EE.UU. a la hegemonía regional. Poco después, la Pri-
mera Guerra Mundial conduciría a los Estados Unidos a la primacía mundial. El canal 
era mucho más que la construcción de una ruta marítima entre los océanos Atlántico 
y Pacífico; significaba que Estados Unidos era un poder capaz y dispuesto a reformar 
el hemisferio occidental en su camino para convertirse en una potencia mundial.
Un siglo más tarde –en 2014– China anunció que comenzaría una empresa similar 
en Nicaragua. ¿Cuáles son las implicaciones geopolíticas para América Latina? ¿Está 
señalando una política exterior china más asertiva que busca –por ambición o por 
necesidad– desafiar a EEUU en el hemisferio occidental? ¿Es esta remodelación 
geográfica también refleja políticamente la aparición de una potencia mundial?
Palabras clave: América Latina, China, Estados Unidos, geopolítica, Panamá.
A ROTA DA SEDA LATINOAMERICANA: 
A CHINA E O CANAL DA NICARÁGUA
Resumo
A construção do Canal do Panamá pelos Estados Unidos em 1914 provou defi-
nitivamente a ascensão dos EUA à hegemonia regional. Pouco depois, a Primeira 
Guerra Mundial levaria os EUA à primazia global. O canal era muito mais do que 
a construção de uma rota marítima entre os oceanos Atlântico e Pacífico, signi-
ficava que a América era um poder capaz e disposto a remodelar o Hemisfério 
Ocidental em seu caminho para se tornar uma potência mundial.
Um século mais tarde –em 2014– a China anunciou que começaria uma em-
presa similar na Nicarágua. Quais são as implicações geopolíticas para a América 
Latina? Será que isso sinaliza uma política externa chinesa mais assertiva buscan-
do –por ambição ou por necessidade– desafiar os EUA no Hemisfério Ociden-
tal? Essa reformulação geográfica também reflete politicamente a emergência de 
uma potência mundial?
Palavras-chave: América Latina, China, Estados Unidos, geopolítica, Panamá.
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Introduction
In 1914, the Panama Canal opened 
its locks. In 2014, the Chinese com-
pany HK Nicaraguan Canal Develop-
ment Investment Co Limited (HKND) 
announced that the construction of 
another canal across Nicaragua would 
begin on December 22nd. It was much 
more than the construction of a new 
shipping route between the Atlantic 
and Pacific oceans. It was a signal of 
the emergence of a country with the 
capacity and the will to reshape geo-
graphic realities according to political 
necessity. The Panama Canal not only 
expanded international trade, it con-
solidated regional hegemony in the 
Western Hemisphere in America’s as-
cending road to global primacy. Can 
the historical contrasts and parallels 
between the Panama and Nicaragua 
canal building enterprises offer signi-
ficant and useful comparison for the 
current state of international affairs? 
Is the Nicaragua canal’s geographic 
reshaping also politically reflecting the 
emergence of a new world power? Is 
it signaling a more assertive Chinese 
foreign policy seeking –by ambition 
or by necessity– to challenge the US 
in the Western Hemisphere? Will the-
re be geopolitical implications for US-
Latin America relations?
The essay proposes four sections in or-
der to answer this question. The first 
one is historical, explaining why the 
comparison on causes and effects of 
the Panama and Nicaragua canals is 
sound and relevant. The second ex-
plores the economic logic of building a 
second canal in Central America. The 
third section explores a geopolitical 
reading of the canal, illuminating as-
pects that are not obvious or apparent 
when considering only the economic 
point of view. The last section explo-
res the geoeconomic and geopolitical 
reshaping of Latin America along an 
Atlantic and Pacific axis. As the rising 
US in 1904 reshaped the region along 
the North-South divide, so is China 
exerting a gravitational pull towards 
the Pacific not just for countries in the 
region but for the Latin American re-
gion as a whole.
History repeating?
In 1880, a private French company led 
by Ferdinand de Lesseps -the builder 
of the Suez Canal in Egypt- began ex-
cavating. American interest in a canal 
dated at least as far back as 1850, when 
the United States and Great Britain ne-
gotiated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to 
rein in rivalry over a proposed canal 
through Nicaragua. The Hay-Paunce-
fote Treaty of 1901 abrogated Clayton-
Bulwer and licensed the US to build 
and manage its own canal. A canal in 
Panama would have economic and 
military advantages for the US, but it 
would also present potential vulnera-
bilities if it were not under American 
control. De Lesseps project threatened 
American dominance of the Western 
Hemisphere. President Hays reassured 
Congress that the “policy of this coun-
try is a canal under American control.” 
Although de Lesseps was not acting 
on behalf of the French government, 
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many in Washington saw such foreign 
involvement as contrary to the Monroe 
doctrine. After a scandalous bankrupt-
cy, the Compagnie Nouvelle du Canal 
de Panama was liquidated and taken 
over by the United States. What began 
as a profit-seeking private enterprise 
ended as a governmental project pus-
hed forward by strategic geopolitical 
considerations? If HKND’s efforts in Ni-
caragua fail in a similar fashion, what 
–if any- will be the involvement of the 
Chinese government?
In 1902, the United States reached an 
agreement to buy rights to the French 
canal property and equipment. A ne-
gotiation then began for a treaty with 
Colombia, for at the time Panama was 
a province of Colombia. When the 
Colombian Congress grew unforthco-
ming, the US government and Pana-
manian business interests collaborated 
on a revolt. President Theodore Roo-
sevelt dispatched warships to Panama 
City (on the Pacific) and Colón (on the 
Atlantic) in support of Panamanian in-
dependence, achieved in November 
1903. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 
of 1903 bequeathed the United States 
rights to a Canal Zone in perpetuity. 
After one hundred years since cons-
truction completion, the geopolitics of 
the Western Hemisphere have been 
significantly transformed. Then Assis-
tant Secretary of State for the Western 
Hemisphere Affairs State Roberta Jaco-
bson openly recognized this increasing 
change of balance of power within 
Latin America in 2014: “Frankly, 10 
years ago when they began, people 
would ask me, why are you having 
conversations with the Chinese on 
Latin America? Nobody asks me that 
question anymore. It’s now very ob-
vious why we have those conversa-
tions”. Nevertheless, at present, there 
is no evidence to think that China is 
or would be able or willing to exert 
such level of control over any country 
in the Western Hemisphere. This kind 
of diplomatic heavy handedness has 
not even been observable in its imme-
diate sphere of influence. Moreover, 
Beijing is concerned that becoming a 
dominant player in Central American 
affairs could galvanize anti-Chinese 
interests in the United States to the 
detriment of the US-China bilateral 
relation. It seems unlikely Beijing will 
jeopardize the bilateral relation with 
the US to gain a pyrrhic influence in 
Central America. It has been a corners-
tone of Chinese engagement with La-
tin America to demand the switching 
of diplomatic recognition from Taipei 
to Beijing. Non-recognition of the 
Taiwanese government is a precondi-
tion for conducting formal diplomatic 
relations with the People’s Republic of 
China. It is also an implicit promise of 
access to a wide portfolio of material 
benefits. Of the seven Central Ameri-
can countries, six –Belize, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Panama- recognize Taiwan. Chinese 
proposed canal participation has come 
in the way of private companies see-
king profits rather than the Chinese 
government pursuing influence. This is 
especially true in the case of the Ni-
caragua canal. Of the $124.5 billion 
China has loaned to 14 Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean countries between 
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2005 and 20151, Nicaragua has not 
received a single disbursement.
Economics & geoeconomics 
Economic arguments surrounding the 
Nicaragua Canal stress several ele-
ments pointing to the unfeasibility of 
the project, pointing that due diligen-
ce has yet to determine if this is not a 
fraudulent deal with a front company 
to get a concession and then resell the 
rights. For example, the initial works 
will be the development of a new 
commercial port at Brito and a free 
trade zone with an airport around the 
city of Rivas. It takes almost a day to 
make the 48-mile trip along the Pana-
ma Canal. The 172.7 mile route of the 
Nicaragua Canal would require that 
ships either lay up at night, or naviga-
te in the dark, making it much more 
costly and difficult. But even if the 
canal itself is not built, those projects 
alone could deliver enough economic 
benefits for HKND. Other arguments 
against the canal point to the lack of 
technical expertise by HKND for a pro-
ject of such magnitude. In this sense, it 
is suggestive that China Railway Road 
lacks hydrological experience to dig 
a canal possessed by other Chinese 
companies with established presence 
in Latin America (China Harbour, Si-
noHydro, China Water and Electric) 
CRR does have experience in cons-
tructing ports and highway infras-
tructure. A third cluster of arguments 
warn that domestic political and en-
vironmental opposition could derail 
construction. Addressing these con-
cerns, former Sandinista guerrilla lea-
der Eden Comandante Zero Pastora is 
now in charge of dredging operations 
along the San Juan River for the canal. 
He has publicly attested to the credi-
bility of the project, when he referred 
to the head of HKND -Wang Jing- as 
“a man who knows what he’s doing. 
The opposition didn’t want to believe 
it, and they even talked about el chi-
no as if he were a phantom. But now 
they know it’s true”. Wang lost more 
than 80% of his fortune in the Chinese 
stock market crisis of 2015. Financial 
problems, along with ongoing envi-
ronmental and engineering reviews, 
were causing severe delays. Indeed, 
as of October 2016 there was no evi-
dence of actual construction despite 
government´s insistence to the con-
trary. With regards to opposition, the 
Pew Global Attitudes Project 2014 
shows 58% of Nicaraguans hold posi-
tive views of China, while only 19% 
have negative ones. And 74% believe 
that China´s growing economy is a 
good thing for the country, while only 
13% rate it as a bad thing.
Another set of economic arguments 
raise an eyebrow over the comparati-
ve and competitive advantages of mul-
tiple canals in Central America. These 
arguments point out to time differen-
1 China-Latin America Finance Database, Inter American Dialogue, available at http://www.
thedialogue.org/map_list/, accessed Dec. 2016.
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tials and cost advantages of Panama 
over its alternatives. The current Pa-
nama Canal limits transit to vessels 
with nominal carrying capacity of up 
to 5,000 twenty-foot equivalent unit 
(TEU), carrying up to 62,000 metric 
tons of bulk cargo at a 40-foot draft. 
So it is unable to accommodate ves-
sels in the Post-Panamax size range, 
which can reach (or exceed) 1,200 
feet in length, 160 feet wide, and 50 
feet in draft. After expansion, Panama 
now accommodates vessels with no-
minal capacity of up to 13,000 TEUs, 
carrying up to 140,000 metric tons of 
bulk cargo at a 50-foot draft. But even 
the expanded Panama Canal cannot 
handle the largest Post-New Pana-
max (16,000 TEUs) or Triple E (18,000 
TEUs) vessels, which account for over 
10% of global container shipping ca-
pacity2. Scale efficiencies of the mega-
freighters will be reduced by longer 
transit times and higher fuel costs 
in the Asia-US East Coast route. For 
the Shanghai-Baltimore trip, a Cen-
tral American route is around 2,500 
miles shorter than through Suez and 
3700-4600 miles shorter than around 
Cape of Good Hope. Panama and 
Nicaragua are geographically close 
enough to make price and safety the 
main factors in taking a commercial 
decision. With actual cost of the Ni-
caragua project around $100 billion, 
fees would have to more than double 
Panama’s to be economically compe-
titive. As such, the canal seems more 
a political enterprise than a business 
opportunity.
The roots of China’s economic trans-
formation result from industrialization 
and urbanization processes happening 
at 100 times the scale and at ten times 
the speed of the first country to indus-
trialize, the United Kingdom. It is also 
occurring in against the backdrop of a 
highly integrated, interconnected glo-
balized world. The growth in seaborne 
trade could provide a compelling logic 
for a second canal: according to the 
WTO, the dollar value of global trade 
is projected to continue to grow at a 
rate of 9% to 2020, and the growth 
of maritime trade by volume by 3-4% 
through 2020. To sustain this process, 
China needs bulk cargo –freight that 
is not packaged such as oil, minerals, 
and grains– from abroad. This has in 
turn expanded China’s maritime inter-
ests and stakes in international mariti-
me waterways. The wide span already 
reflects its position as the world’s lar-
gest exporter and second-largest im-
porter. Bulk kind of cargo requires the 
use of specialized ships and specia-
lized transshipment points. Because 
this kind of cargo is prone to econo-
mies of scale, vertical integration crea-
tes efficiencies opportunities. Hence, 
Chinese shipping firms are responding 
by seeking presence in a select group 
of ports that can be able to cater to the 
new more fuel-efficient generation of 
mega-vessels.
2 As of 2016, the average size of units in the global commercial fleet was 3,832 TEU, and the 
average size of those on order was even larger at 8,030 TEU.
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The World Shipping Council estima-
tes that seven of the top ten world 
container ports are located in Chi-
na: Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen 
Ningbo-Zhoushan, Guangzhou, Qing-
dao, and Tianjin. China controls a fifth 
of the world’s container fleet mainly 
through giant state-owned lines. Of 
the top ten biggest freight shipping 
companies in the world, China Ship-
ping Container Lines (CSCL), and 
Shanghai-based China Ocean Ship-
ping (COSCO) occupy the ninth and 
fifth positions, respectively. Shipping 
has been trending towards consolida-
tion, since it has become increasingly 
challenging for lone operators to survi-
ve. The CSCL-COSCO alliance answers 
a 2013 move by the world’s three bi-
ggest container shipping operators: 
Denmark’s Maersk Line, France’s CMA 
CGM, and Switzerland’s Mediterra-
nean Shipping Co (MSC). By weight, 
41% of ships built in 2012 were made 
in China. In 2013, ports and termi-
nals with a disclosed mainland Chi-
nese stake connects the world’s main 
trade routes from East to West from 
Singapore, Kyaukoyu (Myanmar), 
Chittagong (Bangladesh), Hambantota, 
and Colombo in Sri Lanka on the Bay 
of Bengal. The line continues with the 
Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi 
on the Arabian Sea, ending in Djibouti 
on the Gulf of Aden. Sailing up the Red 
Sea and through Suez into the Medite-
rranean, where COSCO Pacific is buil-
ding a dock at Piraeus (Greece) able 
to handle mega-ships to cover Euro-
pe to Antwerp/Zeebrugge in Belgium, 
in order to cover the shipping route 
to North America. The top five trade 
shipping routes are thus covered: Asia-
North America, Asia-North Europe, 
Asia-Mediterranean, North Europe-
North America, and Asia-Middle East. 
Ships, ports, and routes all constitute 
part of a corporate competition for in-
fluence with geopolitical components. 
A Central American passageway could 
become of vital strategic importance in 
this dynamic.
Geopolitics
But an alternative waterway to the 
Panama Canal would carry strategic 
economic and military value. In the 
current world, these locations and faci-
lities could have dual civil and military 
use. Control of this geographic featu-
re would allow Chinese shipping safe 
passage, but also for commercial use 
and for military power projection. If 
the Nicaragua alternative were ponde-
red by Beijing assisted by such geopo-
litical considerations, then it would 
reveal Beijing’s intention to exert di-
rect or indirect territorial control due 
to a fundamental strategic mistrust re-
garding access and governance of the 
Panama Canal. 
Besides the Nicaraguan project, 
Guatemala’s privately-held Inter-
Oceanic Corridor Board announced 
that it would start construction of an 
interoceanic channel to be completed 
by 2019. Both Honduras and Colom-
bia are negotiating with China the buil-
ding of dry canals. The Honduran –in 
the Gulf of Fonseca– will be built by 
China Harbour Engineering Company, 
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while the Colombian –between Ba-
hía Solano on the Pacific and Acandi 
in the Caribbean– by China Railroad 
Engineering Company. Even Mexico 
is considering reactivating the old ca-
nal through the Tehuantepec isthmus. 
Due to their physical characteristics, 
some of these alternatives would ne-
cessitate a transshipment point in the 
Caribbean or the Cuban port of Ma-
riel, West of Havana. Brazil and Cuba 
agreed in 2009 to develop Mariel, 
through a partnership between the 
Brazilian construction giant Grupo 
Odebrecht and a state-owned Cuban 
company, operated by PSA Interna-
tional of Singapore. Mariel´s role as 
major transshipment role is blocked 
by the American trade embargo, sin-
ce ships which have been to Cuba 
are barred for six months from Ame-
rican ports. However, it is clear Bra-
zilian companies are acknowledging 
the geographic position of Mariel will 
give them an advantage to supply the 
American market in a post-embargo 
scenario. When Havana becomes a 
player in the world economy, this stra-
tegic advantage will alter the geoeco-
nomics of the Caribbean Basin, what 
would demand a geopolitical rethink 
of the regional balance of power. Such 
geoeconomic readjustments will have 
an impact on the political economy 
structures of American states and cities 
with the busiest ports in the country 
due to the increased traffic between 
East Coast /Gulf ports and Asia. West 
Coast ports could be also affected, for 
the new canals may open up oppor-
tunities for seaborne goods movement 
competing in price and time with rail 
and truck logistics across the US. Even 
before expansion, the Panama Canal 
had shortened maritime distances bet-
ween American East and West coasts 
by a factor of 8,000 miles. According 
to a November 2013 DoT report, top 
ports in the US include: California (Los 
Angeles & Long Beach), New Jersey 
(Newark), Georgia (Savannah), Texas 
(Houston), Virginia (Norfolk), South Ca-
rolina (Charleston), Washington (Seat-
lle, Tacoma), Maryland (Baltimore), 
and Florida (Miami, Jacksonville, Port 
Everglades). The new geoeconomics 
of canal expansion and competition in 
Central America will have an impact 
on grain exports from the U.S. Midwest 
states of the Grain Belt and open up 
new opportunities for exports derived 
from the shale revolution. 
But economic benefits have a different 
logic than power gains. At present, the-
re is no proven connection between 
HKND’s private initiative and any kind 
of governmental strategic imperative 
in a Central America Canal, as was the 
case with the US Department of War 
directing the excavation in the Panama 
Canal. President of the Inter-American 
Dialogue Michael Shifter stated in 
early 2014 in his Congressional hea-
ring testimony, “extra-hemispheric ac-
tors involvement is bound to increase 
in the coming years, but there is little 
indication they can pose a serious dan-
ger or threat to US interests”. Yet, there 
seems to be growing evidence pointing 
in the direction of this being a syner-
gistic project with a deliberate turn to 
sea power by the Chinese government 
that would go beyond expanding na-
Mariano Turzi
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val capabilities. In geopolitical terms, 
sea power means the ability to safe-
guard maritime access (control) and –if 
necessary– to disrupt the access of ri-
vals (denial). The father of sea-power 
theory, Alfred Thayer Mahan, held 
that any contender for hegemony ne-
eds overseas access to raw materials 
and markets to expand its production 
in order to marshal national power. 
A maritime grand strategy would de-
mand access of gateways or vital sea 
passages (Gibraltar, Suez, Panama). As-
serting some level of control over the-
se vital waterways is critical to secure 
economic and military advantages and 
at the same time to prevent adversarial 
interference by denying the ability to 
endanger those advantages. However, 
it is not entirely clear that a Mahan-
inspired naval strategy for China would 
assign strategic priority to the control 
of a Central American canal. This was 
a key element in the US power con-
centration capabilities between two 
oceans. The equivalent for China 
would be isthmus formed by the Malay 
Peninsula and the Sumatra archipelago 
in the South China Sea rather than any 
second canal in Central America. Wri-
ting about the isthmus, Mahan himself 
recognized the US interest to be “both 
commercial and political, that of other 
states almost wholly commercial”. 
When Vice-President Joseph Biden 
toured the Panama Canal expansion, 
in November 2013, he refrained from 
any public mention of a competing ca-
nal. As the Nicaragua canal is officially 
a private project, the US government 
cannot be perceived as provoking a 
public controversy with China.
Mahan also argued that power to pro-
tect merchant fleets had been a deter-
mining factor in world history. China 
today cannot claim global sea power 
status in Mahan’s sense of the term. 
However, its rising economic importan-
ce and growing political clout in a con-
text of globalization are undergirded by 
the expansion of sea-borne commerce 
and sea-based resource extraction. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
Bush and Clinton administrations be-
lieved the world would come together 
under a globalized order. Indeed, since 
the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, 
US foreign policy has advanced uncha-
llenged the globalization of capitalism, 
anchoring a global commercial and fi-
nancial infrastructure in the WTO and in 
the IMF. The security precondition that 
made it possible was the commanding 
geopolitical position of the US Navy pa-
trolling sea lanes, providing at once re-
lative peace and survival of the systems 
that govern international trade and ca-
pital flows. China has taken maximum 
advantage of the system to benefit its 
own interests, but did not participate 
in setting the rules of the international 
economic order. After the 2009 finan-
cial crisis, China decided to engage glo-
balization on its own term. The growing 
dependence on sea lanes led in 2004 
to the expansion of the People’s Libe-
ration Army (PLA) naval capabilities, 
both to protect the country’s access 
to resources and markets and to deny 
opponents the ability to endanger that 
access. The 2004 “new historic mis-
sions” of the PLA set forth by Hu Jintao 
affirmed that China’s global economic 
interests had created global political in-
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terests. Beijing thus officially recognized 
its national interests extended beyond 
its borders and charged the PLA –and 
its Navy- to base its strategy on those ex-
panding interests, not just geography. In 
October 2011, the Chinese Navy’s hos-
pital ship, the Peace Ark, visited Cuba, 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Cos-
ta Rica under the banner “Harmonious 
Mission 2011” to provide medical ser-
vices to local populations. It constituted 
China’s first operational naval mission 
to the Caribbean Sea. The route chosen 
was through the Panama Canal. In No-
vember 2013, Chinese naval taskforce, 
which is composed of the guided mis-
sile destroyer “Lanzhou”, the guided 
missile frigate “Liuzhou”, and the com-
prehensive supply ship “Poyang Lake” 
visited Valparaiso in Chile, Rio de Janei-
ro in Brazil, and Buenos Aires Argentina 
successively. The PLA Navy taskforce 
carried out the first joint military exer-
cise with the Brazilian Navy and paid 
the first visit to Argentina. This time, the 
road for the 28,000 sea mile voyage 
was through the Strait of Magellan.
The geopolitical key question is 
whether China is rising peacefully 
within a US-led order or if it is biding its 
time until it has more power, if globa-
lization is an enough powerful force to 
decisively shift interests and intentions 
towards the first option. The issue lies 
in the balance between the realist idea 
that raison d’etat –the pursuit of the 
national interest- will guide action and 
raison de système, the liberal belief that 
it pays to make the system work. Glo-
balization as interdependence acts as a 
preventive structure against belligerent 
(“unpeaceful”) rise. The use of force 
for redistribution of power is ruled out 
as a rational option. In this sense, 2014 
is not analogous to 1914. The structure 
of the current liberal institutional, eco-
nomically interconnected world order 
means rising powers make both abso-
lute and relative gains in both material 
capabilities and status. The inverse is 
also true for declining powers. Howe-
ver, these changes take place without 
precipitating major hostilities because 
there is a two-way process in which 
the rising power accommodates itself 
to the rules and structures while es-
tablished great powers accommodate 
changes in rules and structures to ad-
just to the new power realities. Is the 
Nicaragua canal signaling that China 
will challenge the US in the Western 
Hemisphere? The US government po-
sition for the last two decades was ba-
sed on the assumption that conflict can 
be avoided by integrating China into 
the framework of international insti-
tutions created by the West. Theore-
tically, this position is best articulated 
by liberal internationalist John Ikenbe-
rry: “the United States cannot thwart 
China’s rise, but it can help ensure that 
China’s power is exercised within the 
rules and institutions that the United 
States and its partners have crafted 
over the last century, rules and institu-
tions that can protect the interests of 
all states in the more crowded world 
of the future”. In policy terms, during 
the Bush administration Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of State for East Asia and 
Pacific Affairs, Thomas J. Christensen 
had written (2008) he: “would sum 
up Bush’s strategy toward China as a 
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long-term effort to shape the choices 
the leadership in Beijing makes about 
how to use China’s increasing regio-
nal and global influence”. In his No-
vember 2014 speech to the APEC CEO 
Summit, then US President Obama 
was categorical: “The United States 
welcomes the rise of a prosperous, 
peaceful, and stable China. In fact, 
over recent decades the United Sta-
tes has worked to help integrate China 
into the global economy -not only be-
cause it’s in China’s best interest, but 
because it’s in America’s best interest 
and the world’s best interest. We want 
China to do well”3. However, an op-
posite, more realist-inspired position 
starts from the assumption that conflict 
between the United States and China 
is inevitable and that the United States 
should be prepared to react.
A new gateway to the pacific…?
Compounding the geopolitical effect 
of the technological revolution leading 
the United States to become an energy 
superpower with the logistical capaci-
ty to ship oil and especially liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) in shorter, cheaper, 
more direct ways will shift global ener-
gy supplies. Until 2015 only 8% of the 
world’s LNG fleet could fit through the 
Panama Canal. Post-expansion, the 
percentage will be more than 90%. 
Compared to the Suez Canal rou-
te, vessels travelling from the Gulf of 
Mexico to Asia via Central America 
would save about 5,300 nautical mi-
les each way, around 11 days. More 
competitive transportation could re-
duce Asian gas prices by 10-15%, in 
a region where 2013 prices were 45% 
and 400% higher than Europe and 
North America. This has the potential 
to drastically change the balance of 
power in Asia. Specifically, for key US 
allies in the region and critical actors in 
Washington’s strategy towards a rising 
China: Japan, India, and South Korea. 
Asia was responsible for up to 72% of 
spot LNG in 2012. Japan, Korea, and 
India alone accounted for 61%.
The International Energy Agency’s 
World Energy Outlook 2013 estimates 
LNG demand will increase by almost 
half to 2035 and sees Japan’s LNG con-
sumption grow by 30-40% to 2020. 
Tokyo is the main global LNG impor-
ter, alone responsible for one sixth of 
global demand. Increased supply and 
ease of access will mean the US will 
have the economic and geostrategic 
capabilities to reinforce Japan’s energy 
security. A long-term, abundant, and 
reliable LNG supply from the US could 
divert Tokyo away from increasing its 
dependence on the Middle East and 
Russia. There are very large natural 
gas supplies being produced now from 
the Russian island of Sakhalin expor-
ted to Asia. It might even contribute to 
relieve some of the pressure to adopt 
an aggressive stance in disputes with 
3 Available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/10/remarks-
president-obama-apec-ceo-summit, accessed Dec 2016.
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China over the energy-rich East and 
South China Seas such as the ongoing 
territorial dispute with China over the 
Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field. Energy 
insecurity is of secondary importance 
in this argument, but it has become a 
catalyst for Chinese-Japanese rivalry 
and sovereignty issues. With regards 
to India, consumption is expected to 
grow at 2% annual rate to 2040. Delhi 
faces severe supply constraints, due to 
obstacles on the construction of three 
pipelines that would provide India 
with natural gas from Iran, Turkmenis-
tan and Myanmar. By providing India 
with an LNG alternative route to energy 
security, the US would also disentangle 
Delhi from the geopolitical intricacies 
of depending on higher-risk providers. 
This is also the case for South Korea, 
which does not have international gas 
pipeline connections and can therefo-
re only import gas via LNG tankers. 
Since early 2015, the trend has been 
supported by the return to liquefaction 
terminal sanctioning and the diversifi-
cation of energy matrices fostered by 
cleaner energy alternatives. The advent 
of fracking in the US and refinery capa-
city expansion elsewhere has supported 
rapid fleet growth: LPG carrier fleet ca-
pacity has grown by 32% and LNG ca-
rrier fleet capacity by 12%. US supply 
would have a built-in predictability 
from unexpected production or ship-
ping disruption. Qatar is the top glo-
bal LNG exporter, representing roughly 
one-third of the global LNG market. 
Therefore, acts of terrorism, political 
instability, diplomatic sanctions or mili-
tary action in the Strait of Hormuz lea-
ding to supply disruption would wreak 
havoc in importing countries. This 
would send shockwaves across Asia in-
creased export supply and would provi-
de credible signals to strategic allies and 
economic partners of the United States’ 
commitment both to a stable Asia and 
to free trade. Since export and import 
decisions are made by corporate actors 
led by profit motives rather than gover-
nments guided by security concerns. 
In this sense, the ongoing Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP) negotia-
tions could be the institutional under-
pinning to align private sector incentives 
to state interests. As U.S. foreign policy 
pivots to Asia, a new Canal in Central 
America would become the economic 
asset and strategic lynchpin for the U.S 
to provide increased energy security 
and pricing relief to LNG importers in 
the Asia Pacific region.
…Or a gateway into the Atlantic
The geographical severing of the Ame-
ricas was a clear sign that the US was 
being able and willing to exert a com-
manding position in the Western He-
misphere through political power and 
technical prowess. If the isthmus was 
in the 20th century America´s gateway 
to the Pacific, it could become in the 
21st century the geopolitical equivalent 
for China into the Western Hemisphe-
re. Much more than an impressive 
feat of engineering, the Panama Canal 
ushered in the transformation of the 
American continent. Is the Chinese an 
equivalent attempt? Is it proof of waning 
U.S. influence in the region? The US go-
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vernment maintained a clear position 
on the issue since 2005 when Depu-
ty Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of 
Western Hemisphere Charles S. Shapi-
ro testified before Congress: “we sup-
port China’s engagement in the region 
in ways that create prosperity and pro-
mote transparency, good governance, 
and respect for human rights”. In Nov-
ember 2013, Assistant Secretary of Sta-
te for the Western Hemisphere Affairs 
Roberta Jacobson held in China the 
sixth China–U.S. Consultation Meeting 
on Latin America Affairs, a mechanism 
for consultation on regional issues that 
stems from the framework of Strategic 
and Economic Dialogue between the 
two countries. In March 2014, she rati-
fied the position of the US government: 
“The only thing that is very important 
is that all of us, whether companies or 
governments of China or South Ame-
rica or North America or Europe, play 
by the same rules and that there is 
transparency in these exchanges and 
trade between countries, and that the 
people, the people can see what the 
benefits are, what are the terms of tra-
de. If we are playing with international 
rules, and if the agreements between 
countries or companies comply with 
work standards, of labor or environ-
ment that are the laws of the country, 
then there is no problem with the pre-
sence; and it would really be a positive 
thing for the region”. The acknowled-
gement of power asymmetries seems to 
be evident on the Latin American and 
Chinese sides: Nicaraguan president´s 
brother and former Defense Minister 
Humberto Ortega has been on the re-
cord stating that both the president and 
the Chinese government know that if 
the canal “goes ahead, it will have to be 
with an American-Chinese agreement”
Bi-oceanic canal developments in 
Central America must be understood 
as part of a broader transformation oc-
curring in Latin America. The entire re-
gional infrastructure network is being 
increasingly re-directed towards the 
emerging economic center of gravity 
in the world. Led by China, the Asia 
Pacific region is creating a “pull force” 
for countries in all the Western He-
misphere that reinforces a pattern of 
international political economy based 
on commodity exports. Latin America 
is impelled to link with Asia in time-
lier and less expensive ways. This is 
leading to an across the board infras-
tructure overhaul of the entire regional 
transportation and connection system, 
including highways, railways, and wa-
terways. Because of the critical role of 
shipping, ports, and canals –whether 
the upgrading of the existing Panama 
Canal or the projection of potential 
new ones– become an element in this 
process of transformation. The myriad 
of new infrastructure projects reveals 
an economic imperative on the part 
of Latin America to connect to the Pa-
cific. While developments answer to 
changing geoeconomic realities, what 
-if any- will be the geopolitical con-
sequences of this structural shift? An 
example of this was first brought to the 
attention of senior US government offi-
cials with the January 1997 award to 
the Chinese firm Hutchison-Whampoa 
of a 25-year renewable concession to 
operate container shipping terminals 
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in Balboa (on the Pacific side) and 
Cristóbal (in the Caribbean side) of the 
Panama Canal. Infrastructure develo-
pment, soft financing, and market ac-
cess have historically been classic tools 
for expanding state influence. China is 
not an enemy of the United States but 
it is a legitimate peer competitor. The 
critical geopolitical question is if and 
how will China leverage economic as-
sets into strategic advantages; how will 
it translate its new position into power, 
its importance into influence. Is the 
canal China’s “pivot to the Americas” 
or a symbol of an emerging multipolar 
structure of international relations? 
Conclusion
So far, there is no convincing evidence 
the Nicaragua canal project answers 
to calculated great power rivalries be-
ginning to play out in the Western He-
misphere. But the persistent concern 
seems to be more a product of Ame-
rican concerns than of Chinese actions 
or Latin American intentions. 
While military analysts have warned 
about China being able to create di-
versionary crises or conduct disruption 
operations in close proximity to the 
United States such as trying to close 
off strategic choke points such as the 
Panama Canal, Ortega´s brother told 
the press (Anderson, 2014) that “for 
the Chinese, the canal will be a playing 
card with which to talk to the gringos 
and to gain an advantage somewhere 
else. But the gringos will have to be 
the gatekeepers. If not, there will be 
no canal.” 
Neither is there evidence that a se-
cond canal throughout Central Ameri-
ca –even if control of such canal was 
exerted by China in the way the US 
did over Panama- would be detrimen-
tal to the national interest of the Uni-
ted States. In the 2005 Senate hearings 
about the Panama Canal, then Depu-
ty Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Western Hemisphere Affairs Rogelio 
Pardo-Maurer declared: “China is one 
of the largest users of the canal and 
fast-growing. So from what we can tell, 
it is in their interest to have a canal that 
works and is dependable and reliable. 
So to me the canal is actually a classic 
example of how bringing China in or 
helping China become a responsible 
trading partner, a responsible mem-
ber of the world trading community, is 
in our interest. It makes the canal so-
mething that they have an interest in 
cherishing and defending. The short 
answer is that the most common con-
cerns that I have seen out there, that 
because a certain company that has 
Chinese investors, controls the termi-
nal facilities of the canal, that, there-
fore, we need to be concerned, that I 
think is not a concern”4.
4 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Challenge or Opportunity? China’s Role in Latin 
America”, September 20, 2005, https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/general/one_item_and_
teasers/file_not_found.htm accessed Dec. 2016.
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China is no longer rising. It is already 
risen; and an indicator of this critical 
turning point happened in the Western 
Hemisphere with the project of the Ni-
caragua canal. Its rise in the US area of 
influence is already recognized by Chi-
na, by the US, and by Latin America.
The issue is not what kind of rise will 
it be, but what will it do with its new-
found risen status. The Nicaragua ca-
nal is an indicator of Beijing’s growing 
interests in the Western Hemisphere, 
but does it indicate that China sees the 
region –if even partly– as an arena for 
strategic competition to improve its 
geopolitical position? 
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